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THE POWER TO MAKE WAR
Dennis J. Kucinich*
Thank you very much for the invitation to be here at Loyola
Law School and to attend this prestigious forum with the distin-
guished guests. Years ago, during the height of the Vietnam War, I
was a copy boy at the Cleveland Plain Dealer. It was my responsi-
bility to go out on what were called "art runs" to pick up photographs
of young men whose families had been notified that their sons had
just been killed in action. Often, I would drive up to a small
wooden-framed house in the inner city, one with a blue star decal in
the window. I was greeted quietly at the door and immediately
walked into a front room where a mother and father huddled, weep-
ing on an old sofa, holding the latest photo of their loved one in
military dress. As I stood on a threadbare rug and asked for the pic-
ture so I could take it back to be published in the next day's paper, I
kept thinking that these people are my parents' age, and this is a
home just like the one we live in, and their son was about my age or
perhaps younger.
I am from a generation which came of age during the Vietnam
War. Vietnam forced us to study war, caused us in literature classes
to discern the messages of the early twentieth century poets like Wil-
fred Owen, who wrote "Dulce et decorum est Pro patria mori.... It
is sweet and meek to die for one's country. Sweet! and decorous!'
* Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich is a graduate of Case Western Univer-
sity, where he received a masters degree in speech and communications. At
the age of thirty-one, Congressman Kucinich was elected mayor of Cleveland,
Ohio, making him the youngest person ever to be elected mayor of a major
American city. He has also served in the Ohio State Senate, concentrating on
matters involving utilities, healthcare, and environmental and labor issues. In
1996, he was elected to represent Ohio's tenth district in the United States
Congress. During the crisis in Kosovo, Representative Kucinich argued force-
fully for a more active congressional role in the decision-making process.
1. WILFRED OWENs, Dulce Et Decorum Est, in THE POEMS OF WILFRED
OwENs 117, 117-18 (ion Stallworthy ed., 1986) (emphasis added).
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While serving one's country is certainly an honor, questioning one's
country is a necessity. And while Terry Priebe, with whom I played
baseball was killed in action, and Mark Fusile, with whom I played
pinochle was killed in action, and Michael Aurady, with whom I
went to high school was killed in action, their memories have stayed
fresh in my mind through the intervening years. Thus, while I have
stopped studying war, I did not stop asking questions.
Now, as a member of Congress, whose career has been built by
knocking on doors, stepping into people's living rooms, and asking
for their votes to represent them directly in the democratic process, I
must not just ask questions. I must provide answers to my constitu-
ents' concerns. If the sons and daughters of America are to be sent
off to war, in whatever cause, no matter how lofty the rhetoric, no
matter how high-minded the sentiments, I have to be able to look
parents in the eye. I must be able to tell them it is necessary; it is
right; it is just; and it is honorable. I am not an attorney, not a con-
stitutional scholar, but it is my firmest belief that as a member of
Congress, I have a responsibility to protect the constitutional author-
ity of Congress-the democratic institution of Congress. I believe
that as a member of Congress, I have a moral and legal responsibility
to my constituents and to my nation to regard the power to make war
with the utmost circumspection and to ensure the democratic princi-
ples of consent and accountability are upheld, especially in moments
of crisis. As a citizen of the world, I have a responsibility to make
sure that our nation does no harm and that we should abide by the
highest standards of justice in pursuit of humanitarian goals.
Thus, I have to raise the question about the United States and
NATO in their efforts to intervene in Kosovo and throughout Yugo-
slavia. These efforts violated the Hague Conventions of 1907, which
prohibit attacking undefended buildings and bombing a place without
warning.2 These actions violated the UN Charter of 1945, which
states that members should refrain in their international relations
from threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of any state.3 These actions violated the North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949, which states that the parties should settle by peaceful
2. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 1 Bevans 631.
3. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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means any international disputes in which they may be involved.4
These actions violated the Geneva Convention of 1949, which pro-
hibits attacks on objects indispensable for the survival of a civilian
population. These actions violated the Helsinki Accords of 1975,
which state that European boundaries cannot be changed by force.
These actions violated the 1980 Vienna Convention on Treaties,
which bars using coercion to make nations sign agreements, 7 which
is what the United States did at Rambouillet8
When the United States joined NATO in the bombing of Ser-
bia,9 I was sent on a personal odyssey, which put me opposite my
President, my political party, and members of my own Croatian fam-
ily who had lost friends and relatives in a war with Serbia a few
years earlier. I knew from history that Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution gives the war-making power to the Congress,' 0 and I
looked to history for guidance. In the guidance, I found principles
that are not shopworn canards, but extensions of the democratic the-
ory which became embodied in our Constitution.
George Washington in 1793 said, "The Constitution vests the
power of declaring war in Congress. Therefore, no offensive expe-
dition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliber-
ated upon the subject and authorized such measures."" In a letter to
4. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 1, 63 Stat. 2241, 2242, 34
U.N.T.S. 243,244.
5. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 19, 6
U.S.T. 3114,3128.
6. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act,
Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1294; Richard B. Lilich, Helsinki Accord, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 470.1,470.4 (2d ed. 1990).
7. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 52,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331,344.
8. See Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the
Lawfulness of NATO's Use of Militar Force to Defend Kosovo, 23 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 295, 303 (1999).
9. See id. at 302.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("The Congress shall have Power...
[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water.").
11. William M. Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare
War, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 695, 703 (1997) (citing 33 GEORGE VASHINGTON,
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 73 (J.C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)).
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James Madison, in 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote, "We have already
given in example one effectual check to the Dog of war by transfer-
ring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legis-
lative body .... ", James Madison, in 1793, said, "[T]he power to
declare war, including the power of judging the causes of war is fully
and exclusively vested in the legislature ... He wrote to Jeffer-
son about 1798, "The constitution supposes, what the History of all
Govts. demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most inter-
ested in war . most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied
care, vested the question of war in the Legisl .... ',"4 In the Feder
alist Papers, Alexander Hamilton proceeded with providing a critical
distinction between the role of the United States' President as con-
trasted with the King of England, writing that
[t]he President [as] commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States . . . would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the mili-
tary and the naval forces, as first General and admiral of the
Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets
and armies,--all which, by the Constitution under consid-
eration, would appertain to the legislature.' 5
In later writings, Hamilton would repeat his conviction that "Con-
gress shall have the power to declare war, the plain meaning of
which, that it is the peculiar and exclusive duty of Congress when
this nation is at peace to change that state into a state of war."' 6 And
finally, James Wilson, who helped to frame and ratify the Constitu-
tion predicted, "This system will not hurry us into war. It is calcu-
lated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man
12. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 397 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
13. "Helividius" Number 4 (Sept. 14, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON106, 108 (Thomas A. Mason etal. eds., 1985).
14. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1789), in 17
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104, 104 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1966).
16. 8 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 246 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1903).
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or a single body of men to involve us in such distress, for the impor-
tant power to declare war is vested in the legislature at large."'
7
The fact that the practice of administrations throughout our
country's history has varied from what may be assumed to be the in-
tent of the founders and Framers is not at issue today. It is a well-
established fact that American presidents have used the power to en-
gage in war and to commit troops without specific authorization.18 It
could be argued, and it is, that presidents often must act quickly to
protect U.S. interests, and that Congress is unwieldy, or alternatively,
that Congress has approved declarations of war whenever the presi-
dent has asked them to do so. However, a series of Chief Executives
has taken the initiative to send U.S. troops into action and conflict,
and Congress sometimes has kept a distance, staying away from the
untidy business. It could be argued that the founders and Framers
had no intention of placing the power of war-making in anything but
the hands of Congress. And while those hands have trembled and
even pushed away the reins, that does not negate the thoughtful ar-
chitecture of the separation of powers and checks and balances that
went into the Constitution and underpins our democracy.
In an effort to rebalance our political system, which has tended
towards an imperial presidency, Congress enacted in 1973 a law in-
tended to facilitate the role of Congress in carrying out its duties un-
der Article I, Section 8: the War Powers Resolution.19 When the
War Powers Resolution was being drafted, a significant change oc-
curred that did not get included in this Act. The War Powers Reso-
lution let the President commit the nation to war and then gave the
Executive at least sixty days to withdraw and to report back to the
Congress. 20 Instead of Congress assuring the right of prior approval
of war-making, the War Powers Resolution gave the Executive the
17. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at
528 (2d ed. 1937).
18. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 56
(1991); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Origi-
nal Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 172 (1996).
19. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1994)).
20. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(c), 1544(b) (1991).
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right to wage massive war for months without congressional ap-
proval.
21
In this era of modem war-making, with our nation having un-
limited destructive power at its disposal, the yielding of the war
power to wage war for even a single day can lead to incredible casu-
alties. Over the course of the war in Yugoslavia, the U.S. and NATO
inspired action resulted in tens of thousands of bombing runs, loss of
thousands of lives, tens of thousands of injuries, and property dam-
age in the tens of billions of dollars, all done without the consent of
the United States Congress.2 In fact, the reporting requirements of
the War Powers Act should be inspected. There are eighteen cases
of intervention without reporting to Congress.23 There are seventy-
six cases during the time of the War Powers Resolution of "interven-
tion with reports.,,24 That the administration simply reports on inter-
vention does not necessarily mean that Congress is going to take a
role. However, the War Powers Resolution does exist, and with all
of its flaws, it does provide that after troops have been committed,
those forces must be withdrawn within sixty to ninety days, unless
Congress formally declares war or authorizes the power to remain.25
War is not always legal, nor is it academic to the victims. I
watched in horror the video account of attacks by the forces of Slo-
bodan Milosevic upon the people of Kosovo.26 The massacre at
21. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 18, at 181-82.
22. See Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism ": Prom-
ise of Peril?, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 167-68 (1999); David Wood,
U.S. May Have Learned Wrong Lesson in Kosovo, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 25,
1999, at A31 (reporting the cost of the seventy-eight day air war and 23,000
bombs and missiles at two to three billion dollars); Anthony H. Cordesman,
The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo (Ctr.
For Strategic & Int'l Studies, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 29, 1999, at 21 (reporting the
use of precision guided weapons); Press Release, NATO, NATO's
Role in Relation to Kosovo (Aug. 9, 2000), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/Kosovo.html (reporting that the Human
Rights Watch estimates between 488 and 527 civilians lost their lives during
NATO's air campaign).
23. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 181-82.
24. See id. (reciting specific instances of presidential military action with-
out congressional authorization but reporting action in a timely manner).
25. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(c), 1544(b).
26. See CNN the World Today: Latest Kosovo Violence Dims Hope that
War Can Be Avoided (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 17, 1999), available at
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Racek moved me deeply enough to call the White House and ask if
something should be done to resolve the growing crisis. The grim
procession of refugees surely necessitated a humanitarian response.
Unfortunately, the administration's response did not include getting
the approval of the House of Representatives to enter into a sharply
escalating conflict with NATO against Yugoslavia. 27 Many mem-
bers of my own party, Democrats, felt a need to support the decision
that the administration had made in Yugoslavia.
Indeed, I am a witness to many heartfelt, personal, impassioned
speeches inside our caucus stating the humanitarian cause, averring
that we were preventing genocide and stopping a bloodless dictator
intent on total destruction of the Albanian people. I strongly ob-
jected to the attacks on the Kosovo Albanians. But, I believe that it
was possible to be opposed to Slobodan Milosevic and also opposed
to the bombing of Yugoslavia. Yet all around me I could feel the
dense illogic of war beginning to grip Washington. D.C. was be-
coming the capital of dichotomized thinking, of split consciousness,
of Democrats versus Republicans, of left versus right, which is the
stuff of which wars are made, of us versus them: of NATO versus
Serbia, of NATO versus Yugoslavia, of NATO versus Russian inter-
ests. This type of thinking is what makes it possible to defend the
human rights of some while depriving others of theirs.
As the U.S.-NATO bombings became "humanitarian" bombings
and dead civilians became "collateral damage," and accidental
bombings and the assignment of collective guilt only to the Serbs
seemed to justify each other, I began to speak out against the war and
made several attempts to try to limit it. I wrote a letter to the New
York Times, which created a stir, asking, why are we bombing Bel-
grade.28 This led me to get even deeper into the question, because
the public response to my letter was so powerful. Until, at last, on
April 28, 1999, Congress had to forcefully face the issues of the war.
Congress, first, as was recounted, voted against a declaration of
LEXIS, News File.
27. See President's Address to the Nation, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
516 (Mar. 24, 1999) (announcing that he authorized military air strikes against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
28. See Dennis J. Kucinich, Wiy is Belgrade a Target?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 1999, at A23.
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war.29 They next voted to prohibit the use of funds unless the de-
ployment of troops was specifically authorized by law. They then
defeated a resolution which directed the immediate removal of the
troops.3' Finally, they voted against a resolution, which would have
authorized the United States to conduct military air operations and
missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This
resolution was Senate Concurrent Resolution Twenty-One.32 I went
to the floor of the House of Representatives and argued against the
resolution and passed out a leaflet on the floor, which said the reso-
lution was a blank check for war33 because once it passed the House,
the resolution would have met the test of the War Powers Act, which
required authorization of the use of force by both houses of Con-
gress.34 The President then would have been able to conduct war
without having to come to Congress, since it had already passed in
the Senate.35
Shortly after that, I joined Representative Tom Campbell of
California in a lawsuit to reinstate the power of Congress.3  There
was a hearing a month ago in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.37 I am proud to have the opportunity to take a
stand on behalf of an American tradition of representative govern-
ment. Next year I am going to be introducing in the House of Repre-
sentatives a plan for a Department of Peace. The plan intended to
change the consciousness of this nation, so that we do not look at
war-making as a means of resolving international disputes and so
29. See 145 CONG. REC. 2440 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999) (rejecting proposal
to declare war by vote of 2 to 427).
30. See id. at 2413.
31. See id. at 2427 (rejecting resolution directing President to remove
troops by a vote of 139 to 290).
32. See id. at 2451-52.
33. See id. at 2446 (statement of Rep. Kucinich).
34. See id. (referring to Section 5 of the War Powers Resolution which re-
quires the President to terminate force unless Congress officially declares war).
35. See id.
36. See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999) (seeking a
declaration that the President violated the War Powers Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution and the War Powers Resolution by conducting air strikes in the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia without congressional authorization).
37. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming the
District Court of the District of Columbia's decision to dismiss because plain-
tiffs lacked standing to file suit).
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that we can look at conflict resolutions to help make us a more
peaceful people as we approach new ways of dealing with difficul-
ties, dissensions, and conflicts at every level of our society. Thank
you very much.
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